The Debatable Land

Obama and Europe, Cont.

Dan Drezner politely suggests I'm talking (or writing, rather) through my hat in this gloomy assessment of the transformational potential of the Obama presidency. Dan prefers to see the potential rather than the pitfalls. And he may be correct. It would probably be better for all if he were.

As it happens, I do think he's right to argue that many european policy elites - and certainly much of the think tank world - do believe that Afghanistan must and can be saved. And it is certainly possible that withdrawing form Iraq (if that proves possible) could create the space and manpower needed to refocus on the "Good War". Nonetheless, I suspect european public opinion has soured on or, to be more generous, is simply confused by a conflict that drags on with little sign of progress, let alone an endgame. Now it's certainly possible that Obama can leverage his popularity and the idea of a fresh start and lead by example in Afghanistan. Jim Jones' experience with NATO and Europe Command should help - though of course Jones will be familiar with the limits of what NATO can realistically achieve, as well as its potential.

Iran seems more difficult, however. The proliferation consequences of an Iranian bomb are, to say the least, disconcerting but it's hard to imagine there being any european enthusiasm for a military strike against Tehran. And that, of course, remains the default, bottom-line US position. Let us hope it never comes to that.

What is also striking, however, is how, as Ben Macintyre writes in the Times today, Obama's relationship with europe is very different from that of most of his predecessors. It's not merely that he's a different generation, it's that his cultural background is Kenya, Kansas, Hawaii and Indonesia. He's one of the few Presidents of recent times who has not looked to europe and perhaps the first to see it as just another, if still important, place. Even Bill Clinton had been a Rhodes Scholar (though not a particularly happy one) while George W Bush had actually spent more time in Scotland than any other foreign country prior to becoming President. And of course, he was part of an Andover and the Ivy League elite, even if he had transferred his primary self-identity to Texas. His father, of course, like Reagan before him, was steeped in the transatlantic alliance.

So, even more than Clinton and Dubya, Obama's Presidency marks a break with the established conventions of the transatlantic alliance. An alliance built, of course, on WW2 and the Cold War. His memoir, as Macintyre reminds us, finds Obama feeling “edgy, defensive, hesitant” while travelling in Europe. “It wasn't that Europe wasn't beautiful,” he writes. “It just wasn't mine.”

Perhaps this means Obama has the benefit of a fresh, less misty-eyed perspective, one that casts off the humbug of the "Special Relationship" and enduring ties with the "old continent". But it may also mean - time will tell! - that he's less instinctively attuned to european sensibilities and interests. His enthusiasm for Georgian and Ukrainian NATO membership could be taken to suggest that, for instance.

On the flip side, Obama's break with history may mean that he will be less likely to take the Bushian attitude that "you guys owe us". A partnership needs to be just that and it's not a partnership if one side isn't on occasion permitted to say "No". Still, so far Obama seems to have been suggesting a recalibration of the essential Washington worldview, rather than any fundamental change to it. Nonetheless, as I say, it would might well be best if Dan is right and I am, er, not.

The Continued Absence of a Golden Age

Commenting on the future of transatlantic relations, Anthony writes:

The plain fact of the matter is that there are structural issues at play that will ensure tensions remain. One of the great pieces of historical revisionism spurred by the Bush 43 tenure is the conviction that has emerged that under Clinton Euro-American relations were going well. They weren't. Most of the time it was poison. Even between Clinton and Blair things turned fairly sour...

We should hope for the best with the emergence of the Obama administration. And at the very least it'll give me an excuse to start having a go at the Continentals again. But managing expectations, so to speak, is undoubtedly the right way to go. There are plenty of issues that have the potential to cause ructions.

That's not to say, incidentally, that the problems are ALL structural. This is an argument generally employed by Bush 43 apologists to support the notion that it doesn't matter how undiplomatically the US government acts because the results will be the same and it should be resisted. But let's not get carried away.

This is entirely true. We forget too often how much the Balkan wars strained the transatlantic alliance and how close NATO came to breaking up over Kosovo. That wasn't the only issue, of course, but it was probably the biggest, most complicated one. You'll recall how Blair and Clinton were reduced to shouting matches over Kosovo and, previously, how Clinton and John Major had rowed over Bosnia and Northern Ireland. Now in the end most (or at least many) of these differences were resolved, but they were, in some ways, easier than many of those which face the west today.

Obama's European Gambit

Matt Yglesias wrote a column last week in which he disputed what he termed the "counterintuitive" view that President Obama's relations with Europe will not necessarily improve as much or as swiftly as is commonly imagine. On the contray, he suggested, simpley a) not being George W Bush and b) not going out of his way to insult or alienate Europeans would indeed go a long way towards reviving a spirit of transatlantic comity. Robert Kaplan made some similar points in the Atlantic: Obama enters the market at a time when US foreign policy stock is so depressed, the only way is up.

Now clearly there's something to this. European public opinion is likely to be vastly more receptive to President Obama than it has been to President Bush and it's true that this may create some room for European governments to hop on board and enjoy the ride alongside the new American president. But at the risk of seeming a terrible spoilsport, might I suggest that  friendly and polite attitude may not be enough?

This week, for instance, NATO meets in Brussels and, for some reason, the idea of Georgia and the Ukraine joining the alliance is back on the agenda. Perhaps the new President will be able to persuade us that this is a fine and sensible idea, but it's not clear what arguments he can deploy that are not already in the field. And if he wants a favour on this then it's reasonable to suppose that there'll be a price to be paid elsewhere.

Then there's Iran. It's no secret that Obama's proposals for engagement with Tehran have worried some in Vienna, Berlin, Paris and London. Now it may well be that Obama's ideas are good ones, but he hasn't yet (obviously) persuaded Europe that they are. Indeed, the Bush administration has pursued a kind of quasi-realist, multilateral approach in its second term that could itself be taken as a refutation of its more ill-tempered approach in its first four years. And yet despite this mollification and prudence, significant differences remain between the Atlantic allies.

No surprise there, perhaps. And the US cannot have it both ways: it cannot reasonably ask Europe to do more and then complain if Europe declines to fall into line behind US proposals. Doing more requires a greater degree of independence from Washington.

And so to Afghanistan. Obama, like Bush and SecDef Gates before him, is likely to ask Europe to pour more troops into Afghanistan and to loosen rules of engagement once the boys are in theatre. As Matt puts it, there's no guarantee that Obama can achieve this:

But what improved U.S. standing in Europe will do is transform the politics of the situation. At the moment, even those European political leaders who agree on the merits of the American perspective are terrified to say so. The combination of Bush's toxic unpopularity and the sense that help given to the U.S. in Afghanistan would, in effect, be assistance for what's widely viewed as a criminal enterprise in Iraq makes it a nonstarter. A new administration and a timeline for withdrawal from Iraq would clear the air. And steps to show that Europe's high hopes for Obama in terms of basic human rights, diplomatic courtesy, and engagement with issues like climate change would allow Obama to make his case to Europe's people and turn public opinion around. At a time when the United States is militarily and financially exhausted, but also desperate for a renewed approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan, that's change we need.

Perhaps Obama really can persuade European public opinion. But since, as matters stand, no-one thinks there's a military solution to the Afghan problem I'm not quite sure what Obama can offer to make the mission any more appealling. Put yourself in Danish or Portuguese or Italian shoes: what's in it for you? Why would you join a mission no-one thinks is winnable? (Maybe a new strategy can change that, but that too is something that remains to be seen.) It isn't simply Iraq; it's the growing perception that many people feel they have little to know idea why, nearly seven years later, we're still in Afghanistan. What are we actually doing there? What can we actually realistically hope to achieve?

And I'm afraid that closing Guantanamo and (officially at least) putting an end to torture are necessary first steps, not an end in themselves. That's the bare minimum required and no-one should think Washington will get credit for this. It's like asking to be applauded for ceasing to beat your wife. Sure it's better than continuining to beat her but just stopping doesn't change the fact that she's a bloody mess. 

It would be lovely to think that Obama can bring a new period of transatlantic harmony. But it just isn't the case that American interests are necessarily the same as European interests. The Security Card trumped everything during the Cold War but these are changed times. And there were, in any case, always more differences than seemed the case then too, these days they're much clearer to see. A new President may find it difficult to change that. Or, to put it another way, he may need to give something up himself to advance American interests in other areas.

Dick Cheney's Mission to Destroy Europe

I don't nornally write about Euroloonies, partly because I have trouble taking the European Parliament any more seriously than I do the Liberal Democrats. That is to say, it - and they - cross my mind no more than twice a year. But this, via the indomitable Trixy, is sufficiently priceless as to merit attention:

Questions over the funding of the No campaign in Ireland on the Lisbon Treaty referendum
Raising a point of order, Co-President Daniel Cohn Bendit (Greens/EFA , Germany) said: "Last weekend, the Irish press revealed that there possibly exists a link between the financers of the no-campaign in Ireland and the Pentagon as well as the CIA. This was a very interesting story and the explanation given was that Europe should not become too strong. I would ask the President to please clarify this matter and suggest that we also ask the Council as well as the Commission to inform us next time, because if this story turns out to be true it would be an interesting fact indeed, confirming what lies behind the €1.2 million which was used to finance the no-campaign in Ireland. I therefore would like to ask the President to please look into the matter so that we receive information and achieve transparency."

Of course, people who bore on about "transparency" invariably have plenty to hide themselves. Not that anyone would ever suggest such a thing about the European Parliament. Oh no. Nonetheless, it's also reassuring that, despite everything, some things never change: members of the European Parliament are still reliably, even reassuringly, loopy.

How Bush Made Life Easy for Europe

I've a piece up at Culture11 considering some of the problems Europe may face when confronted by the next American president. Snippet:

The election of a new American President is also a test. One which will determine, as is sometimes avowed, if European discontent is merely a manifestation of anti-Bushism rather than a more virulent, infectious anti-Americanism.

In truth, the two cannot be so easily disentangled. Yet Europeans may one day reflect that, unlikely as it may seem, Mr. Bush was a better friend to Europe than they ever imagined. Politics is always a matter of style and substance. Mr. Bush’s style permitted Europe to turn away from and reject the substance of his presidency. In other words, the brutishness of the Bush White House and Pentagon, it’s casual, cavalier disregard for the interests and favor of its friends, gave Europeans license to opt-out of the American worldview. Mr. Bush’s successor may not grant the continent that luxury.

The Belgian Example

Whither Belgium? Again. Ian Buruma frets that the break-up of Belgium would be A Bad Thing. As is generally the case with such articles, concrete arguments for this proposition are notably absent. Thus, Buruma:

So the fate of Belgium should interest all Europeans, especially those who wish the Union well. For what is happening in Belgium now could end up happening on a continental scale.

Why, for example, should the prosperous Germans continue to have their tax money pooled to assist the Greeks or the Portuguese? It is difficult to sustain any democratic system, whether on a national or European scale, without a sense of solidarity. It helps if this is based on something deeper than shared interests: a language, a sense of common history, pride in cultural achievements. The European identity is still far from being solid.

Perhaps the citizens of Belgium do not have enough in common any more, and Flemish and Walloons would be better off being divorced. But one hopes not. Divorces are never painless. And ethnic nationalism unleashes emotions that are almost always undesirable.

We know what happened when the twin pulls of blood and soil determined European politics before. Without having intended it, the EU now seems to be encouraging the very forces that postwar European unity was designed to contain.

But, as I have suggested before, this gets it the wrong way round. Tensions between Flemings and Walloons are the consequence of european success, not failure. They are only possible because of the post Cold War shake-up and the success of the EU as a pan-continental project. Peace and prosperity have consequences of their own.

Equally, one consequence of greater centralisation in Brussels is a growing desire for autonomy amongst what one might term Europe's "stateless nations". That being the case, it's surely not a great surprise that some of the old nation state capitals are being squeezed. In one sense it's a case of local borders and differences mattering more, but that's within a context in which such borders and differences actually matter less.

And is this really such a terrible thing? Does it matter if, say, Italy were to fragment into two or three or four pieces? (Unlikely, but you never know). Or Spain? (Also fairly unlikely). Or Britain? (Less unlikely). Would Europe, or the "European Idea" be doomed if Bavaria became an independent country? It's hard to see how this would automatically be the case.

It seems perfectly possible that there are areas in which a political confederation mustering some 300 million people would be the most appropriate area for collaborative action and other areas in which smaller entities might be better placed to act. If that means there's less need for a nation state of 40-70 million people then so be it. I can't quite see how this is going to cause the sky to fall, unless one thinks it likely that Wallonia might go to war with the Flemish provinces to win Brussels or that Scotland and England are likely to resume cross-border raiding.

Indeed, one can foresee a possible future for Europe in which Brussels accrues more power and becomes, in some respects at least, a European Washington while the 30 or 40 (or more?) nations that make up the Union become rather like the 50 states of the great American political union. Now, I would hope that Europe would learn from the American mistakes and ensure that more, not less, power was retained at a local level but that will require a degree of vigilance since, as in Washington, bureacrats in Brussels like to accumulate, not delegate, power and responsibility.

Equally, one would hope, in this putative and perhaps unlikely future, that Brussels would realise that there are some things it cannot do well. In this too one would hope that it would learn from the American example. One reason I'm sceptical about both candidates for the Presidency is that I'm increasingly persuaded that the job of being President is an impossible one. That's as it should be, in many ways, of course. No one man should have that much power and idea of national solutions for a continent of 300 million people seems an oxymoronic proposition. Perhaps the US has become too big, too complex to be governed by a small group of people cloistered in Washington? If so, then good: the logical answer would be to return power to the states, granting them a greater degree of de facto independence from the centre.

To take this further - and to move into increasingly speculative territory - would the sky fall if, say, Texas or Vermont or California secceded from the Union? Or if British Columbia, Washington State and Oregon formed a new Republic of their own? Perhaps. But also, perhaps not? Sure, there might be regrets and, yes, something might be lost. But something else might be gained.

Which is to say that though such change would obviously be unsettling, many of these countries are young affairs in the first place. And, for that matter, if independence is a good thing for Estonians or Kosovars, then why is it so frightening if the Flems or Walloons or Scots also want a slice of that cake for themselves?

Cry Heffer for England and St George...

Happy St George's day, English readers. To mark the occasion, the Telegraph offers us Simon Heffer, the would-be John Wilkes of our times, to declare the Union "as good as over". And this, according to Heffer, is a fine thing since it ensures that England can finally be free from Tartan oppression. Apparently there's been a conspiracy to to prevent the English from being, well, English:

St     Patrick's, St David's and St Andrew's days were decreed as the moments when the oppressed proclaimed their identity and possibly even their liberation.

The only thing the English could possibly do on St George's  Day was to reflect upon their centuries of evil, so it really was best not to make a fuss. Anyone seen sporting a red rose or a cross of St George on the day itself was clearly mentally ill, and worthy only of pity.

The Left, though, has other reasons now to keep its jackboot on the throat of England's national identity. Despite the inroads made by Scottish nationalists, Scotland remains crucial to the Labour Party; Wales scarcely less so.

The exercise of power over nearly 50 million in England is enabled  by Scottish and Welsh Labour MPs sitting in the United Kingdom parliament.

Having the toy of England to play with does not merely provide jobs for a number of them, most conspicuously the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

It also ensures a flow of subsidy - about £11 billion a year to Scotland alone - from England to the client state that Labour has created in those parts. In short, it facilitates gerrymandering of the most grotesque sort...

...Just as there were silly, blimpish men tottering around the corridors of the Tory party in the 1960s and 1970s blithering on about an empire that no longer existed, now their grandchildren, equally absurdly, drivel on about "the Union".

The Union is as good as over: and its demise represents the best opportunity for the Tories to seize serious power that they are ever likely to have again.

Labour, too, used to believe in England, and saw no shame in it: but that was in the days before it had dealt the mortal blow to the Union through devolution, and before a Scottish prime minister needed to legitimise himself by banging on robotically about "Britishness".

In the early years of the last century socialists in England used to sing a hymn about their liberation from exploitation and under-representation: its title and opening line serves as the perfect envoi today. "England, arise! The long, long night is over!"

Stirring stuff. But also perfect tommyrot. The English are as welcome to St George's day as we are to St Andrew's. the real reason St George's Day is smaller beer than the other national saints days is largely because rather a lot of Eglish folk don't see much, or any, difference between Englishness and Britishness. (That attitude, of course, is a major contributor to a kind of girning Scots chippiness that does us little credit. If we could be a more relaxed bunch we could afford to be more relaxed about this. But we're not and it irritates us.)

Still, my paternal grandfather for one would have laughed at the notion that St Andrew's Day had anything to do with "liberation" or, for that mater, "oppression". As a rubber planter in Malaya before the war he considered himself British, "except on St Andrew's night when we were Scottish first". That was in the days of Empire Glue of course. And even these days St Andrew's Day is such a festival of liberation that a) it's not even a public holiday and b) I doubt more than 60% of the population could tell you it falls on November 30th.   

Still, the niceties of the West Lothian Question and the matter of who subsidises who aside, Heffer's analysis betrays a considerable misunderstanding of the forces that led Labour to support devolution. Home rule for Scotland was designed to strengthen the Union, not weaken it. Despite all the Scottish Labour party's blathering about Home Rule being what Keir Hardie wanted, the party was only converted to the cause by the SNP's success in 1974 when the nationalists sent a football team of MPs to Westminster.

Rupert Murdoch's Curious NATO Vision

From James Joyner:

News Corporation chairman Rupert Murdoch says that NATO is in a “crisis of confidence” because Western Europe is “losing its faith in the values and institutions that have kept us free.” He calls for a radical redefinition of the Alliance in order to save it, including extending membership to Australia, Japan, and Israel.

Murdoch, who is receiving the Atlantic Council of the United States’ Distinguished Business Leader Award for 2008, says in his prepared remarks that, “We must face up to a painful truth: Europe no longer has either the political will or social culture to support military engagements in defense of itself and its allies. However strong NATO may be on paper, this fact makes NATO weak in practice. And it means that reform will not come from within.” Accordingly, he continued, “we need to transform this Alliance from a community formed around a map to a community based on common values and a willingness to take joint action in defense of these values.” Indeed, he argued, “Expansion is the only hope of invigorating an Alliance weighed down by those who are no longer willing to commit themselves to defend its founding principles.”

Murdoch contends that, “Around the world, there is no shortage of nations who share our values, and are willing to defend them. I am thinking of countries like Australia, which sent troops to Iraq … Israel, which has been fighting Islamic terrorism almost since its founding … and Japan, which generally follows a more ‘Western’ policy than most of Western Europe.” Ultimately, he argued, “If we continue to define the West or the Alliance as a strictly geographical concept, the Alliance will continue to erode. But if we define the West as a community of values, institutions, and a willingness to act jointly, we will revive an important bastion of freedom — and make it as pivotal in our own century as it was in the last.”

Well, this is what Rudy Giuliani recommended all those months ago when he fleetingly seemed a credible Presidential candidate. And one can see that there's something to it (though the extent of that something may only run as far as your willingness to endorse the theory that we're witnessing - or engaged in - a genuine clash of civilisations).

But... a couple of points need to be remembered. Who are these people "no longer willing to commit themselves to defend [NATO's] founding principles"? One supposes that Murdoch means many western european countries who've been reluctant to send troops to Iraq (and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan). But in what sense is Iraq a conflict to defend NATO's founding principles since the organisation was founded to counter the threat posed by the Soviet Union?

Moreover, it's often forgotten that NATO did in fact treat the September 11th attacks as an act of war upon one of its members and, for the first time in the organisation's history, invoked Article 5 of the NATO treaty:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe  or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties  so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force,   to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

At the time  - ie, autumn 2001 - this was frequently cited in Washington and London as adding legitimacy to the argument in favour of military action in Afghanistan. The subsequent Iraq controversy has overhadowed the fact that, in Britain at least, the Aghan operation was not without controversy. (You may recall the warnings about the Hindu Kush and the Afghan winter and the British and Soviet experiences there).

Equally, it's the case that NATO offers of assistance were - for understandable reasons - brushed off by the United States. As I say, on psychological as well as practical military grounds one can understand why Washington took this attitude but like any other action this decision had consequences. I suspect that european countries would have been prepared to commit more to Afghanistan had they been asked to or treated as allies rather than as unwelcome appendages to US military might.

Subsequently, having been rebuffed once one can see why european countries might have been reluctant to assist the US in Iraq - a mission that was, quite clearly, less than intimately related to the immediate causes of 9/11 and, in any case, unpopular with voters across europe. In those circumstances, in fact, it's striking how many NATO members have contributed at least some troops to Iraq (even if, naturally, these have often been small deployments). Furthermore, it's hard to see why any NATO member would feel an urge to be involved in Iraq given Donald Rumsfeld's admission that the Pentagon didn't need even the 45,000 British troops committed to the invasion force in 2003. Why stick your neck out for no real reward and, domestically, the prospect of real pain in the partnership of an ally who may well regard your presence as an inconvenience?

Then there's this: “We must face up to a painful truth: Europe no longer has either the political will or social culture to support military engagements in defense of itself and its allies."

Well, maybe. But as I say, the recent record (going back to the Balkan wars as well as Afghanistan) doesn't support Murdoch's hypothesis. More immediately, who has actually attacked europe? Does Murdoch really think that europe is under attack? From whom? Clearly there are people - as events n London and Madrid have demonstrated - who wish western europe ill, but in what way, shape or form does Murdoch think that NATO - either as currently constituted or in his expanded version of the alliance - is the best or most appropriate organisation to meet that threat?

Now maybe NATO does need to be reformed, but this doesn't, at first blush, seem an especially persuasive case for doing so.

            

If Holland is being "Islamicised" how can this happen?

Lisa Schiffren at National Review:

The famously tolerant Dutch, whose nation has the highest emigration of any European country as the native born flee the effects of multi-culturalism, Islamisation, and the after effects of legalizing everything, have come up with a new line to cross. Public sex in Amsterdam's city parks will now be legal. But only for gays.

So, assuming Ms Schiffren's analysis of Dutch emigration is correct* (an unlikely proposition to be sure, but...) Holland is waving goodbye to racists and scolds. Would that we could all be so fortunate.

Read the Telegraph story however, and this seems like a perfectly sensible move, designed to put limits on existing behaviour rather than grant license to public orgies:

"Why should we try to impose something that is actually impossible to impose, which also causes little bother for others and for a certain group actually means much pleasure?", he said.

Amsterdam's beautiful Vondelpark in the centre of city draws hordes of summer visitors, families, skaters and joggers.

But the park's rose garden has become famous as a trysting spot for gay men looking for uncomplicated sexual encounters.

Mr van Grieken stresses that tolerance to "cruising" gays, aimed at protecting homosexuals from violence, will have "strict rules attached".

"Thus, condoms must always be cleared away, it must never take place in the neighbourhood of children's playgrounds and the sex must be restricted to the evening and night-time," he said.

Since it seems unlikely that the costs of preventing any consensual public sex seem likely to outweigh the benefits of doing so (in Amsterdam at any rate),  this seems a sensible, practical, regulatory approach rather than further evidence that Europe is going to hell in a handcart, much though that prospect would seem to cheer many American conservatives. 

*Emigration from the Netherlands, like people leaving London for the countryside, seems much more likely to be a product of the fact that Holland is the most densely populated country in Europe.

UPDATE: Schiffren returns to the subject:

It's funny about those Muslims. Some days I think they need a good dose of sexual liberation. Other days I think their revulsion at current mores makes sense.

So should we be more like Saudi Arabia or less? It's sooooo confusing...

Department of Credibility

I'll have more to say about this video discussion at National Review in due course. The summary, mind you, gives you a decent flavour of the thesis:

The Decline and Fall of Europe: Chapter 3 of 5

Prof. Thornton discusses how a bureaucratic European Union “super state” is undermining the old nation-states of England, France, and Germany — a dangerous process. Uber-nationalism, of course, gave us the fascist European movements of the 20th century. Under the “enlightened” guidance of the EU, however, any nationalism is looked upon as reprehensible. Thornton counters that deep-rooted nationalism is a net good, and that its deterioration will coincide with the loss of representative democracy.

But at the risk of indulging a pet peeve or seeming unduly snarky, let me observe that this analysis of Europe might be more convincing if  England were actually a nation-state (or for that matter if Germany were an "old" nation-state). If you can't get the names of the countries correct...

Blair and Brown Part II: This time It's Continental

Great stuff from William Hague in the Commons as he imagines the terror of Tony Blair, President of Europe. American Anglophiles will also like it, since Hague's ability at the Dispatch Box trumps anything the United States Congress can offer.

[Thanks to the ever-redoubtable Mr Eugenides. As th eGreek says, David Miliband's genuine and unforced laughter is worth half a raised eye-brow too.]

Europe: Still Not Dead

Not content with permitting itself to be swamped by Muslim immigration (Quick: man the Viennese barricades!) it seems that poor old Europe is also committing cultural suicide by forgetting to worship god. In fairness, Rod, being smart, doesn't quite share the apocalyptic vision of Europe's future that has become oddly popular amongst American conservatives. Nor, also being smart, does James Poulos who weighs in here.

In any case, the extent of European "godlessness" is exaggerated. For instance, though only 12% of Scots remain official members of the Kirk, the proportion of church going Scots rises to somewhere between one in five and one in four once all other religions and sects are added. Though these things depend upon how one defines "church attendance" other countries have rather/still higher participation rates.

Now, sure, this isn't the universal - or near universal - observance of days gone by. But in an increasingly fragmented society in which (happily) there's space for everyone to do their own thing, religion still does pretty well, even if its customer profile is aging more rapidly than the ecclesiastical authorities might like. In fact even in France more people believe in god than deny his existence.

Actually one could - and I would - make the case that given Europe's 20th century it is remarkable that the continent's cathedrals are as full as they are.

Anyway Camille Paglia complains that art and culture can't survive the death of god. Or the death of opposition to god:

"But primary and secondary education, which should provide an entree to great art and thought, has declined into trivialities and narcissistic exercises in self-esteem. Popular culture, once emotionally vibrant and collective in impact (from Hollywood movies to rock music), has waned into flashy, transient niche entertainment. The young, who are masters of ever-evolving personal technology, are besieged by the siren call of materialism. In this climate, it is selfish and shortsighted for liberals to automatically define religion as a social problem that needs suppression or eradication. Without spirituality in some form, people will anesthetize themselves with drink or drugs -- including the tranquilizers that seem near universal among the status-addled professional class of the Northeastern elite."

"Europe, which has settled into a comfortable secularism, is no model for the future. The great era of European achievement in arts and letters seems to be over. There are local luminaries but no towering figures any longer of the stature of James Joyce, Pablo Picasso, Marcel Proust, Thomas Mann or Ingmar Bergman. Europe is becoming a museum and tourist trap, as people from all over the world flock to see the remnants of Europe's royal and religious past -- the conservative prelude, in other words, to today's slack liberalism."

"Searching, for example, for online news about Italy in recent years, I've been dismayed by its near-total domination by soccer, with archaeological discoveries and the restoration of Old Master paintings coming in second. The pope flits hither and thither, but that's it. Is there nothing new in post-Fellini Italian culture? It's as if Europe, struggling to incorporate massive Muslim immigration, has retreated into a bubble where the beautiful artifices of the past float like a mirage. Secularism evidently cannot stimulate creativity as profoundly as religion does -- whether in the artist's soaring affirmation or angry resistance."

Well, up to a point Lord Copper. I suspect that Paglia's complaint about primary and secondary education has some value. But the rest of her complaint seems overblown. Today's "slack liberalism" after all is the product of democratisation, trade and wealth that, broadly speaking, may be said to have contributed to europe being a happier, better place than at any time in its history. Now, sure, there are grumbles and a certain wane discontent in parts of the continent (Italy, France to some extent) but these are, to some extent, features of European success, not failure. Most people lead immeasurably better lives than did their ancestors.

Paglia complains that "without spirituality" people will "anesthetize themselves with drink or drugs". Well maybe. But if that's the case then, to a very large degree, these tranquilisers have replaced the soporific, controlling, anesthetizing effect of religion itself - as anyone with any consciousness of, say, Calvinist Scotland or Roman Catholic Ireland could tell you. Clearly religion didn't prevent the expression of artistic expression in either country but it determined, within pretty narrow parameters, what was and what was not permissable. Remember that Joyce, like Wilde before him and Beckett after him, had to leave Ireland.

Man is not born happy. Or if he believes he is, he realises soon enough that the expectation that he should have been so blessed is an unkind trick. The test is how you deal with that and religion seems neither better nor necessarily worse than other approaches.

Paglia bemoans godless Europe, but for her thesis to remain valid one should expect the United States to be a hotbed of artistic achievement. After all, America is the great exception to the general rule that prosperity kills religion. And yet I doubt that Paglia thinks this a great era in American arts and letters either.

Most art, of course, is not very good and unlikely to last. 'Twas ever thus. But really Paglia's argument rests upon her distaste for "flashy, transient niche entertainment". But again 'twas ever thus. Once again, we witness a complaint about "niche". But the idea that people should be free to do their own thing - and find their own referred entertainment or vehicles for artistic expression - seems a good thing. There may be costs in moving from a world in which there were certain obviously dominant cultural narratives to one in which culture, like everything else, becomes a kind of all-you-can-eat buffet, but it seems daft not to notice that there are tremendous advantages and opportunities to this too.

Now as it happens I do think that a core, classical curriculum - including as Paglia says, impressing a knowlege of the King James bible upon young minds - is a good thing. For one thing culture that has beaten the test of time has a value of itself; for another it's part of the story of how we came to be where we are. A kind of universal, foundational grammar and the glue that binds past to present. But from that comes an opportunity to branch out in new directions, rather as the poet who has mastered technique is better placed that the poet who has not. The latter may still produce worthy material, but absent that grammar his rane is likely - most of the time - to be more limited.

As for this death of European culture - as demonstrated by the fact that Italians like reading about football, no less! (Though football can often rise to the state of art and, certainly, cultural expression) - well It all depends on what you mean by "local luminaries". But I think that any survey of post-war European - or even contemporary - European culture would reveal that there's life in the old continent yet.

To take a couple of examples that occur immediately: the short-story is an unfashionable form these days, but William Trevor is in the first rank of short story writers. In theatre, whether thy are quite your cup of tea or not, I think one would say that Harold Pinter and Brian Friel are not merely "local luminaries". In architecture, the best work of, say, Richard Rogers or Santiago Calatrava seems worth preserving.

As for literature, well, who knows how many great voice there are that we simply never hear in English? But as I've said before, I think Andrei Makine would not be embarrassed by being included in any survey of the century's finest novelists. Salman Rushdie's partisans would make the case for the best of his work too. In poetry, well, Philip Larkin and Paul Muldoon seem likely to last. A little further back, I'd suggest that Beckett and Camus can hold their own in the ring. One could go on...

And that's before one even considers popular culture: better TV than we'd seen before  - even in Europe: take Prime Suspect (UK) and The Best of Youth (Italy) for instance, while who knows what exciting projects will arise from the european melting pot in years to come, as the continent is energised by immigration from all points of the compass and its internal cultural borders continue to dissolve... 

So, yeah, absurdly, I remain cautiously optimistic. Fail. Fail again. Fail better.

Is Europe a Country?

I'd like to think this is made up. Favourite bit? Hard to say, but "I heard of Turkey" is pretty good.

[Via, Larison]

The Belgian Conundrum

Ages ago - light years in blog terms in fact - Megan noticed The Economist pointing out that the euro has lessened the pressure that Belgian politicians might otherwise face to settle their differences and observes:

Now that the European Union has taken over the currency, as well as many of the trade and customs functions of traditional federal governments, Belgium as a state suddenly looks a lot less necessary. One wonders if the current era of economic integration (assuming it continues) might not bring increasing political balkanization.

Well, yes indeed. The same might be said of the United Kingdom. Moves towards greater regional autonymy across Europe are a direct response to the increasing power of the EU itself. As political life becomes more centralised on one supra-national level, so the forces  - and attraction - of localism become ever more powerful as voters seek a more flexible, responsive form of government in the areas of political life that have the most immediate impact upon their everyday lives.

This should not surprise; for many people what globalisation - seemingly so distant, so impersonal and yet also so very irresistible - strengthens their attachment to smaller platoons. Globalisation breeds localisation, if you will. These trends are  not opposed to one another, however. On the contrary, localism is only possible in the context of an increasingly prosperous, peaceful and open world.

Take the United Kingdom for example. John Steinbeck once wrote that it was wrong to consider Scotland a lost cause, for she merely remained an unwon cause. And there's been many - millions even - of Scots who have been sentimental Jacobites at one point or another. But most of the time for most of us, the head has ruled the heart. The old cause might tug the heart, but sober calculation of the national interest concluded that the Union - with all the security and economic guarantees it offered - was the better deal.

The EU has helped change that calculation, offering some of the same financial and trading advantages as England provided in 1707. An independent Scotland would not be cut adrift to survive alone so long as it was  a member of the EU. It is not accidental that, an oil-related spike in 1974 excepted, the SNP's long, slow rise to prominence in Scotland should have coincided with the party's decision to embrace the promise offered by Europe.

Granted, this means that the party sells a less powerful form of independence than some might like, but it's inconceivable that the SNP could afford, even if it wished to, to turn away from Brussels. The EU has another advantage: it can be used as a defence against the "Little Scotlander" charge some Unionists are keen to make against supporters of independence. We're all internationalists now, don't you know?

Jonah Goldberg prefers to see this as failure. Apparently Belgium's political crisis - though, you know, not having a government doesn't seem to have been the end of the world - is evidence that the EU is useless and that - ha! - all those euroweenies who brag about how brill Europe is are just plain wrong. Well, granted many eurocrats are dreary folk, but the emergence - or re-emergence - of localism should be seen as evidence of success, not failure. When did peace and prosperity become such terrible things?

Here's some more of Goldberg's argument:

But here's the hilarious irony of all this: The European Union is in effect subsidizing nationalism in Belgium and across the Continent. As the EU assumes more of the responsibilities of states -- regulations, the economy, currency, possibly even defense -- the cost of independence becomes lower.

Look at Scotland. The Scots are moving, perhaps inexorably, toward national independence from Britain. A referendum on breaking away is scheduled for 2010 and seems likely to pass. And why not? Scotland didn't formally become part of Britain until 1707, when it caved in to English threats to its trade and the free movement of people across the border. Now, thanks to the EU, such threats are illegal. And it's hardly likely that England would declare war on secessionist Scotland.

A similar process is underway in Kosovo, which wants to break from Serbia (the U.S. backs that idea) and get EU candidacy like Croatia and Macedonia. The Basques in Spain aren't far behind. In the past, ethnic enclaves probably couldn't make it on their own. But now the EU provides a safety net.

The catch-22 is delightful. By scaling back the job description of a nation-state to a few ceremonial duties, ethnic minorities see fewer risks and a lot more rewards in breaking away. Countries such as Slovakia get to trade on their votes in the EU and the U.N. They get their own anthems and sports teams and to teach their own language and culture. It's like a McDonald's franchise. Sure, you man the register and keep the bathrooms clean, but the folks at corporate HQ do the heavy lifting. That's why the Basques, Scots and Flemings are looking to open their own franchises. The question is whether the nationalist hunger of such McNations can be satisfied by just the symbolism of autonomy.

Where to begin? Firstly, Scotland is not moving towards "national independence from Britain". How can you declare independence from yourself? Mr Goldberg may believe that England and Britain are synonyms (though if he doesn't his editors should) but they're not. Secondly, it's far from certain that a referendum will be held in 2001, even less certain that it would be a Yes/No vote on independence and still less clear that it would pass. Britain itself did not exist as a state until 1707, so one might as well say that England didn't become part of Britain until 1707 either. Apart from that, the second paragraph is relatively unobjectionable, though "caved" is an emotive word to describe a rational, if still melancholy, calculation of the national interest.

(One might note that a similarly hard-headed calculation is also behind the best of modern nationalism and that, not for the first time, the advantages of the Brittanic Union will be sold in the form of hard currency...)

At least Goldberg doesn't go down the euro-loopy road travelled by some sceptics who see the entire Brussels project as a mission to destroy the nation-state - and especially Britain - as part of a Franco-German plot to achieve by insidiously peaceful means what - collectively albeit at different times - they had previously tried to do by war: the destruction and break-up of Britain.

Still, the jury is out. One might note that Belgium has not broken up yet and that Catalan nationalism is a less potent political force than it was a decade ago. But what is there to be afraid of here? The dreaded "Balkanisation of Europe" doesn't mean war. And why am I to suppose that Scotland is a "McNation"? There are, pace Rick Blaine, parts of Glasgow where I'd suggest an American conservative might wish to think twice before expressing such an opinion. But really couldn't it be enough to have a pop at Brussels without insulting other countries and peoples? Clearly not.

Now it remains to be seen if the re-emergence of a patchwork quilt-type of European map actually takes place. It may not. But I don't see that this would necessarily be a terrible thing. One future for Europe is indeed as a mosaic of smaller, nimbler states better able to respond to shifting circumstances. Sovereignty on some areas would be pooled  - eg defence - while states would enjoy a free hand domestically. A confederal approach may not happen, of course but it's not something to be terrified of (provided it's built in a proper and consensual manner).

Identity endures. It's not something that can be wished away or destroyed by lines drawn on a map by bureaucrats. That's fine.  But it doesn't have to be threatening either. Hell, Scots know this fine well since we've maintained a sense of ourselves despite 300 years of incorporation into a new, larger Union. Despite that incorporation, however, Scotland retained its own judiciary, educational and religious institutions and systems. The question now is whether Brussels and London might just swap places. Edinburgh-London-Brussels is a long address. Why not shorten it? The argument is tempting and worth considering.

Godlberg seems to think that the EU has failed since it wanted to destroy national identity but that's not really true: it wanted to change the way we think of nationality and, in the European context, it's largely succeeded in doing so, decoupling patriotism from nationalism in ways that have been overwhelmingly healthy.

The re-emergence of Very Old Europe is, then, a tribute to the EU's successes and, consequently, rather more than the chance for a few cheap jokes at the Belgians' expense (not that there's ever anything wrong with said jokes).

Europe not doomed after all shocker!

By which I mean to say that - surprise! - there's evidence that the apocalyptic scenario beloved on the nutty right that Europe will be living - if such an elevated term can be applied to our miserable future - under Sharia law sooner than you can whistle up the call to prayer is, well, a hysterical exaggeration.

From the Financial Times:

Jytte Klausen, a professor of politics at Brandeis University who studies European Muslims, says: “It’s being advocated by people who don’t consult the numbers. All these claims are really emotional claims.” Sometimes they are made by Muslim or far-right groups, who share an interest in exaggerating the numbers.

Nominal Muslims – whether religious or not – account for 3-4 per cent of the European Union’s total population of 493m. Their percentage should rise, but far more modestly than the extreme predictions. That is chiefly because Muslims, both in Europe and the main “emigrating countries” of Turkey and north Africa, are having fewer babies...

But the birth-rates of Europe’s Muslim immigrants, though still above the EU’s average, are falling. The fertility rate of north African women in France has been dropping since 1981, say Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse in their book Integrating Islam. “The longer immigrant women live in France, the fewer children they have; their fertility rate approaches that of native-born French women.”

At the last count Algerian women living in France averaged an estimated 2.57 children, against 1.94 for French women overall.

At the same time, northern Europe has seen a rebound in fertility. Several countries have introduced policies – such as more generous parental leave and better childcare – to encourage people to have babies.

France’s birth-rate is near the replacement level of 2.1. The UK’s fertility rate is at its highest since 1980, thanks largely to older or immigrant mothers – only a minority of whom were Muslims. The number of babies born in Germany has rebounded since the post-war low recorded in 2005...

The US National Intelligence Council predicts there will be between 23m and 38m Muslims in the EU in 2025 – 5-8 per cent of the population. But after 2025 the Muslim population should stop growing so quickly, given its falling birth-rate. In short, Islamicisation – let alone sharia law – is not a demographic prospect for Europe.

[Hat-tip Clive who sensibly adds that this doesn't mean there aren't significant problems that need solutions.]